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Abstract—This paper investigates the security at the physical
layer of cooperative relay communications. Inspired by the
principle of physical-layer network coding (PNC), we propose a
new secure relaying scheme, namely secure PNC-based modify-
and-forward (SPMF). In the proposed scheme, the relay node
linearly combines the decoded data from the source node with an
encrypted key before conveying the mixed data to the destination
node. As both the linear PNC operation and encrypted key at
the relay are unknown to the eavesdropper, the SPMF scheme
provides a double security level in the system. Particularly, taking
into account the practical scenario of the imperfect knowledge
shared between the relay and destination, the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) of the proposed SPMF scheme is analysed and
evaluated in comparison with modify-and-forward, cooperative
jamming, decode-and-forward and direct transmission schemes.
The proposed scheme is shown to achieve a performance improve-
ment of up to 3 dB when compared to the conventional schemes
under imperfect knowledge of shared information between the
nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security at the physical layer has recently attracted increas-
ing interests of broader communications societies, especially in
the context of cooperative communications [1]. On the other
hand, user cooperation has been identified as an innovative
change enabling multi-hop communications to not only extend
the coverage region but also provide higher spatial diversity
gain [2]. The connection between a subscriber and a legitimate
transmitter can be realised with the assistance of multiple
intermediate nodes (or relay nodes) employing either amplify-
and-forward (AF) or decode-and-forward (DF) protocols [3].
Therefore, in order to protect data from vulnerable attacks
in wireless communication systems, the security of both the
direct and relaying links needs to be considered.
From the physical-layer perspective, an information theo-
retic approach has been shown to be able to provide secure
communications between legitimate users by using jamming
signals and appropriate channel coding [1]. A basic approach
was originally proposed in [4] for noiseless channel where the
data is encrypted by simply XORing with shared secret key.
The noisy channel was then investigated in [5] where Wyner
first introduced the concept of wiretap channels. It is shown
that the innate irregularity and diversity of the message could
harm the eavesdropper, and thus strengthen the legitimate
communications. Specifically, independent transmitters can
help in transmitting jamming signals to improve the secrecy
rate of the legitimate users [6], [7]. However, such cooperative
jamming (CJ) can cause interferences that reduce the decoding
rate at the legitimate receivers [8].
Motivated by the concept of network coding (NC) for
improving the throughput of lossless networks [9], [10], secure
NC has been proposed in [11], [12] to improve the security of
wiretap channels. A vast number of works have investigated
the performance of physical-layer NC (PNC) in wireless relay
networks (WRNs) (e.g. in [13]–[15]). The principle of the PNC
is that the relays perform algebraic linear/logic operations on
received packets from multiple transmission source nodes and
then forward the combined packets to the destination nodes in
the subsequent transmissions.
Considering relaying strategies for secure communications
in WRNs, AF-based and DF-based cooperation were inves-
tigated in [16], [17]. Recently, a new cooperation scheme,
namely modify-and-forward (MF), has been proposed in [18]
where the relay first modifies the message received from
the source and then forwards the modified message to the
destination. As it is assumed that the modification operation
at the relay is inherently shared between legitimate users, only
the interested destination can recover the original message
and thus an improved secrecy outage probability is achieved
in comparison with the counterparts using different relaying
techniques. However, over the practical wireless medium, the
channel dedicated for sharing knowledge between the relay
and destination also suffers from fading and background noise,
which may cause performance degradation of the MF scheme.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first
attempt to address this practical security issue of the imperfect
shared knowledge between the relay and the destination.
In particular, we propose a new secure relaying scheme,
namely secure PNC-based MF (SPMF), for a two-hop WRN
consisting of a source node, a relay node and a destination
node. In the proposed scheme, the relay node first decodes
the data received from the source node and then linearly
combines the decoded data with the encrypted key following
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Fig. 1: System model of a two-hop WRN.
the PNC approach before forwarding to the destination node.
The novelty of the proposed SPMF scheme lies in the fact
that the assumption of perfectly shared information of PNC
parameters and encrypted key is relaxed, while only channel
statistics are assumed to be known at the destination.
Furthermore, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) is de-
rived to analyse the effectiveness of the proposed SPMF
scheme in relation to other conventional schemes, such as
direct transmission (DT) [19], DF [16], CJ [6] and MF [18].
It is observed that in the context of imperfect channels for
sharing knowledge between the relay and destination nodes,
the proposed SPMF achieves an improved SOP for higher
security compared to all other schemes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of a two-hop WRN under investigation is
illustrated in Fig. 1. A source node (풮) wants to transmit a data
packet to a destination node (풟) with the assistance of a relay
node (ℛ). A half-duplex system is considered where all nodes
can either transmit or receive data, but not simultaneously.
The data transmission from 풮 to 풟 in the two-hop WRN
basically consists of two time slots as follows: i) Time slot
1: 풮 transmits data packet to both ℛ and 풟 and ii) Time
slot 2: ℛ processes the data packet received from 풮 and then
forwards the processed data to 풟.
Investigating the security issue of the WRN, shown in
Fig. 1, we assume that there exists an eavesdropper (ℰ)
which is located between 풮 and 풟 and in the vicinity of
ℛ. Nodes 풮 and ℛ transmit data with power Λ푆 and Λ푅,
respectively. The communication channel between 풜 and ℬ,
{풜,ℬ} ∈ {풮,ℛ, ℰ ,풟}, 풜 ∕= ℬ, is assumed to experience
identical and independently distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh flat
fading ℎ풜ℬ having 퐸[∣ℎ풜ℬ∣2] = 1/푑휈풜ℬ, where 퐸[⋅] denotes
the statistical expectation function, 푑풜ℬ denotes the distance
between 풜 and ℬ, and 휈 denotes the path loss exponent
between a pair of transceiver nodes. A block-fading model is
considered where all the channel gains are time-invariant over
the whole transmission of a data packet and vary independently
from data packet to data packet. The instantaneous and average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the link 풜 → ℬ are denoted by
훾풜ℬ and 훾¯풜ℬ, respectively.
III. PROPOSED SPMF SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the data transmission, decoding
and encryption process in our proposed SPMF scheme for
enhancing the security of a two-hop WRN.
In the first time slot, 풮 transmits a data packet x to both ℛ
and 풟. Over the eavesdropper channel, ℰ also receives the data
packet from 풮 . The received signal at node 풳 , 풳 ∈ {ℛ,풟, ℰ},
is given by
r(1)풳 =
√
Λ풮ℎ풮풳x+ n
(1)
풳 , (1)
where Λ풮 is the power of the source 풮 and n(1)풳 is an
independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
noise vector at node 풳 with each entry having zero mean and
variance of 휎20 . Then, 풳 decodes the data from 풮 , which is
denoted by x¯(1)풳 .
In the second time slot, after decoding the data packet
received from 풮 , the relay node ℛ linearly combines the
decoded data (i.e. x¯(1)ℛ ) with the encrypted key (denoted by
k) using the PNC approach [10]. The signal forwarded from
ℛ is therefore expressed as
x(2)ℛ = 훼x¯
(1)
ℛ + 훽k, (2)
where 훼 and 훽 are PNC parameters satisfying 훼2 + 훽2 = 1.
Through the second hop, 풟 is expected to receive the data
from ℛ; however, ℰ could overhear the same information. The
received signal at node 풴 , 풴 ∈ {풟, ℰ}, in the second time slot
is given by
r(2)풴 =
√
Λ푅ℎℛ풴x
(2)
ℛ + n
(2)
풴 , (3)
where Λℛ is the power of the relay ℛ and n(2)풴 is a CSCG
noise vector at node 풴 with each entry having zero mean and
variance of 휎20 . Substituting (2) into (3), we obtain
r(2)풴 =
√
Λℛℎℛ풴훼x¯
(1)
ℛ +
√
Λℛℎℛ풴훽k+ n
(2)
풴 . (4)
As the PNC parameters and encrypted key are assumed to
be unknown to the eavesdropper, ℰ only decodes the data in
the first time slot as x¯(1)ℰ . Meanwhile, 풟 is able to decode
the data in both time slots as x¯(1)풟 and x¯
(2)
풟 if the information
of 훼, 훽 and k is perfectly shared between ℛ and 풟. In case
of imperfectly shared information at 풟, maximum likelihood
detection can be used given the known channel statistics of
the link ℛ → 풟.
Remark 1 (Improved Security with SPMF). As shown in
(4), in order to encrypt the data packet forwarded from the
relay node ℛ, two layers of security are integrated into the
proposed SPMF scheme including the PNC parameters (i.e.
훼 and 훽) and the encrypted key (i.e. k). Also, it can be
observed that the encrypted key can be treated as interference
(or jamming). Therefore, a higher security can be achieved
by appropriately controlling these parameters to cope with the
imperfect knowledge of the sharing information.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the SOP of the proposed SPMF
scheme for a WRN. For comparison and completeness of
the analysis, we also provide the SOPs of various schemes
for secure communications including DT, DF, CJ and MF
schemes. The SOP is defined as the probability that the
wireless system fails to achieve a target secrecy rate [16], i.e.
푃표푢푡 ≜ Pr{퐶푠 < 푅푠}, (5)
where 푅푠 > 0 is the target secrecy rate and 퐶푠 is the
instantaneous secrecy capacity. Here, 퐶푠 can be computed by
퐶푠 = max{퐶푑 − 퐶푒, 0}, (6)
where 퐶푑 and 퐶푒 are the instantaneous channel capacity of the
data links to 풟 and the eavesdropping links to ℰ , respectively.
We now proceed to derive 퐶푑 and 퐶푒 of the proposed SPMF
scheme.
A. Proposed SPMF Scheme
Following the same approach as in [3] for DF protocol, the
maximum rate for reliable communications of relaying link
풮 → ℛ → 풟 can be expressed by
퐶푑=min
{
1
2
log2(1+훾풮ℛ),
1
2
log2(1+훾풮풟+훾ℛ풟)
}
. (7)
The instantaneous SNR 훾풮ℛ and 훾풮풟 in the first time slot can
be computed, respectively, from (1) as
훾풮ℛ =
Λ풮 ∣ℎ풮ℛ∣2
휎20
, (8)
and
훾풮풟 =
Λ풮 ∣ℎ풮풟∣2
휎20
. (9)
In the second time slot, 풟 receives the combined data from
ℛ consisting of both the interested information and encrypted
key. In this paper, as the encrypted key and PNC parameters
are assumed to be not perfectly known at 풟, the instantaneous
SNR of the link ℛ → 풟 has to be replaced by instantaneous
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). From (4), 훾ℛ풟
can be determined by
훾ℛ풟 =
Λℛ∣ℎℛ풟∣2훼2
Λℛ∣ℎℛ풟∣2훽2 + 휎20
. (10)
Over the eavesdropper channel, ℰ can only eavesdrop the
data in the first time slot. Therefore, the maximum rate for
reliable eavesdropping at ℰ is given by
퐶푒 =
1
2
log2(1 + 훾풮ℰ), (11)
where 훾풮ℰ is given by
훾풮ℰ =
Λ풮 ∣ℎ풮ℰ ∣2
휎20
. (12)
Substituting (7) and (11) into (6) and (5), the SOP of the
proposed SPMF scheme is obtained as
푃 (푆푃푀퐹 )표푢푡 =Pr {max {log2(1+min{훾풮ℛ, 훾풮풟+훾ℛ풟}
− log2{1 + 훾풮ℰ}, 0} < 2푅푠} .
(13)
It is noted that the derivation of the closed-form expression
for the SOP in (13) is challenging when considering the
instantaneous SINR term 훾ℛ풟 (see (10)). Due to the page
constraint, in this paper, we verify the effectiveness of the
proposed SPMF through the numerical results in Section V.
The analysis is deferred as an extension to the future work.
Remark 2 (Relax of Perfect Knowledge Assumption). From
(10), it can be observed that imperfect knowledge of shared
information (i.e. encrypted key and PNC parameters) is taken
into account in the derivation of 훾ℛ풟 in the proposed SPMF
scheme. In the conventional MF scheme [18] with perfectly
shared knowledge between ℛ and 풟, 훾ℛ풟 is expressed by
훾(푀퐹 )ℛ풟 =
Λℛ∣ℎℛ풟∣2
휎20
.
Therefore, the MF scheme can be regarded as a special case
of the SPMF when 훼 = 1 and 훽 = 0.
B. DT Scheme
In DT scheme, the relay is assumed to be unavailable and
thus, for fair comparison, 풮 sends the encoded data to 풟 using
the power of 2Λ풮 . The SOP of the DT scheme is derived as
in [19], i.e.
푃 (퐷푇 )표푢푡 = 1−
훾¯풮풟
훾¯풮풟 + 2푅푠 훾¯풮ℰ
exp
(
1− 2푅푠
2훾¯풮풟
)
. (14)
C. DF Scheme
In this scheme, ℛ follows the conventional DF relaying
scheme [3]. That is, ℛ decodes the data from 풮 , re-encodes
the decoded data and then forwards the encoded data to 풟.
According to [16], the SOP of the DF scheme is given by
푃 (퐷퐹 )표푢푡 =
2−2푅푠 훾¯풮ℛ [Θ(훾¯풮ℰ)Δ(훾¯풮ℰ)−Θ(훾¯ℛℰ)Δ(훾¯ℛℰ)]
(훾¯ℛℰ − 훾¯풮ℰ)(훾¯ℛ풟 − 훾¯풮풟)
+
Θ(훾¯ℛℰ)−Θ(훾¯풮ℰ)
훾¯ℛℰ − 훾¯풮ℰ ,
(15)
where
Θ(푥) ≜ 푥
2
2−2푅푠 훾¯풮ℛ + 푥
exp
(
1− 2−2푅푠
푥
)
, (16)
Δ(푥) ≜ 훾¯풮ℛ
푥(1 + 훾¯풮ℛ/훾¯풮풟) + 2−2푅푠 훾¯풮ℛ
− 훾¯풮ℛ
푥(1 + 훾¯풮ℛ/훾¯ℛ풟) + 2−2푅푠 훾¯풮ℛ
.
(17)
D. CJ Scheme
In [6], various CJ schemes were investigated. The principle
of the CJ is that different transmitters transmit jamming signals
with the aim of harming the illegitimate receiver. In the context
of the considered WRN, ℛ transmits jamming signals while
풮 transmits the data to 풟. Due to the autonomous property of
the jamming signals, they may confuse ℰ to eavesdrop the data
from 풮 . However, such jamming signals in terms of Gaussian
noise could harm both 풟 and ℰ . Following [6], the SOP of
the CJ scheme is computed by
푃 (퐶퐽)표푢푡 =1−
2−훿
훾¯ℛ풟휁
+
2−훿
훾¯ℛ풟훾¯ℛℰ휁2
[
22푅푠 훾¯풮ℰ(휁 + 1)
훾¯풮풟
×Ξ
(
1 + 휃
훾¯ℛℰ
)
+(휁−휃)Ξ
(
1 + 휃
휃
(훿+훾¯−1ℛ풟)
)]
,
(18)
where 훿 ≜ (22푅푠 − 1)훾¯−1풮풟, 휃 ≜ 22푅푠 훾¯풮ℰ 훾¯−1풮풟, 휁 ≜ 훿+ 훾¯−1ℛ풟 −
휃훾¯−1ℛℰ and Ξ(푥) ≜ 푒푥퐸1(푥). Here, 퐸1(푥) ≜
∫ ∞
푥
푒−푡푡−1푑푡 is
the exponential integral [20].
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
γSE [dB]
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
P o
u
t
DT
DF
CJ
MF (perfect)
MF (imperfect)
Proposed SPMF
Fig. 2: SOP versus SNR of the link 풮 → ℰ .
E. MF Scheme
In MF scheme, ℛ decodes the source message and then
forwards the modified message to 풟 [18]. As the message
difference is assumed to be perfectly shared between ℛ and
풟, 풟 can decode the message while ℰ cannot. As derived in
[18], the SOP of the MF scheme is
푃 (푀퐹 )표푢푡 = 1−
Φ(훾¯ℛ풟)− Φ(훾¯풮풟)
훾¯ℛ풟 − 훾¯풮풟 , (19)
where
Φ(푥) ≜
(
1 +
푥
훾¯풮ℛ
)
푒(1−2
2푅푠 )(훾¯−1풮ℛ+푥
−1)
×
(
1
훾¯−1풮ℛ + 푥−1
− 1
2−2푅푠 훾¯−1풮ℰ + 훾¯
−1
풮ℛ + 푥−1
)
.
(20)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section shows the numerical results of the SOP
achieved with the proposed SPMF in WRNs. In order to verify
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, the performance of
DT [19], DF [16], CJ [6] and MF [18] with either perfect
or imperfect knowledge of shared information between the
relay and destination are provided for comparison. The results
are obtained with MATLAB under different scenarios of
the wireless channel quality, PNC parameters and the target
secrecy rate.
A. Impacts of Source-Eavesdropper Link
Figure 2 plots the SOP of various schemes for secure WRNs
as a function of the average SNR of the link 풮 → ℰ (i.e.
훾¯풮ℰ ). The range of 훾¯풮ℰ is selected to cover −20 to 30 dB
to characterise the performance over a wide band of channel
quality conditions. The other channel SNRs are arbitrarily set
as 훾¯풮ℛ = 20 dB, 훾¯풮풟 = 10 dB, 훾¯ℛ풟 = 20 dB and 훾¯ℛℰ = 15
dB. It is also assumed that the target secrecy rate is 푅푠 = 0.1
b/s/Hz and the PNC parameters are {훼2 = 0.7, 훽2 = 0.3}.
As shown in Fig. 2, a higher 훾¯풮ℰ causes a higher SOP as the
eavesdropper can more reliably decode the source message. It
can be observed that the proposed SPMF scheme achieves a
lower SOP compared to the DT, DF, CJ and MF (imperfect)
schemes at most of the range of 훾¯풮ℰ , while the MF (perfect)
scheme can be regarded as a performance benchmark for
the scenario of perfectly shared knowledge between ℛ and
풟. This accordingly verifies our observation in Remark 1
regarding the improved security with the proposed SPMF
scheme.
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parameters.
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Fig. 4: SOP versus SNR of the link 풮 → ℛ.
B. Impacts of PNC Parameters
Investigating the impacts of PNC parameters on the perfor-
mance of the proposed SPMF, Fig. 3 shows the comparison
of SOP between the SPMF and MF schemes against 훾¯풮ℰ
with respect to various {훼, 훽}. The SNRs of the other links
and the target secrecy rate are set similar to those in Fig. 2.
It can be seen that the proposed SPMF scheme achieves
the same performance as the MF (imperfect) scheme when
훼2 = 훽2 = 0.5. As 훼 increases, an improved SOP of up to
3 dB is achieved approaching the MF (perfect) scheme. This
reflects the generality of the SPMF scheme and also confirms
the statement in Remark 2 showing that the MF (perfect)
scheme is regarded as a special case with {훼 = 1, 훽 = 0}.
C. Impacts of Source-Relay Link
In WRNs, the link 풮 → ℛ needs to be considered for
reliable relaying. Fig. 4 plots SOP versus 훾¯풮ℛ with various
schemes including DT, DF, CJ, MF (imperfect), MF (perfect)
and the proposed SPMF schemes. The SNRs of other channels
are set as 훾¯풮풟 = 10 dB, 훾¯ℛ풟 = 20 dB, 훾¯ℛℰ = 15 dB and
훾¯풮ℰ = 5 dB. The target secrecy rate is also set as 푅푠 = 0.1
b/s/Hz and the PNC parameters are {훼2 = 0.7, 훽2 = 0.3}. It
can be observed in Fig. 4 that, a lower SOP is achieved with
DF, MF and SPMF schemes at high 훾¯풮ℛ. In fact, the high-
quality link 풮 → ℛ provides a reliable relaying, and thus ℛ
can help to enhance the security in WRNs. At low 훾¯풮ℛ (e.g.
훾¯풮ℛ < 10 dB), ℛ may not be able to reliably decode the
data message from 풮 and thus the DT scheme is beneficial.
Additionally, in Fig. 4, the performance of the DT and CJ
schemes is shown to be independent of 훾¯풮ℛ as there is no
relay involved in the DT scheme and the jamming process at
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Fig. 6: SOP versus target secrecy rate.
ℛ in the CJ scheme does not rely on the reliability of the link
풮 → ℛ.
D. Impacts of Source-Destination Link
Taking into account the direct link 풮 → 풟 in WRNs, Fig. 5
plots the SOP of various schemes as a function of 훾¯풮풟. The
SNRs of other links are 훾¯풮ℛ = 20 dB, 훾¯ℛ풟 = 20 dB, 훾¯ℛℰ =
15 dB and 훾¯풮ℰ = 5 dB. Similarly, the target secrecy rate
and the PNC parameters are 푅푠 = 0.1 b/s/Hz and {훼2 =
0.7, 훽2 = 0.3}. It can be observed in Fig. 5 that the proposed
SPMF scheme achieves a lower SOP than the DF, CJ and MF
(imperfect) schemes. The SPMF is shown to be better than
DT scheme at low 훾¯풮풟 (e.g. 훾¯풮풟 < 16 dB). However, at
high 훾¯풮풟, the DT scheme is shown to be the best scheme as
the usage of ℛ is not necessary in this case even may cause
performance loss.
E. Impacts of Target Secrecy Rate
Figure 6 shows the SOP of various schemes versus the target
secrecy rate (i.e. 푅푠). The SNRs of all links are set as 훾¯풮ℛ =
20 dB, 훾¯ℛ풟 = 20 dB, 훾¯풮풟 = 10 dB, 훾¯ℛℰ = 15 dB and
훾¯풮ℰ = 5 dB. It can be seen in Fig. 6 that the SOP increases
over 푅푠. The SPMF scheme is shown to achieve an improved
SOP performance than DF, CJ and MF (imperfect) schemes,
while the DT scheme achieves a better performance at high
푅푠 (i.e. when 푅푠 > 0.9 b/s/Hz). In fact, the relaying schemes
rely on the quality of both 풮 → ℛ and ℛ → 풟 links, and
thus can only provide an improved security at low 푅푠.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an efficient SPMF scheme has been proposed
for secure WRNs to cope with the imperfectly shared knowl-
edge between the relay and destination in the conventional
MF scheme. By employing PNC at the relay with encrypted
key, the proposed scheme has been shown to provide a higher
security compared to the conventional DT, DF, CJ and MF
(imperfect) schemes with respect to various channel conditions
and target secrecy rates. Although the DT scheme should be
more favourable without the need of the relay node when
either the SNR of the link 풮 → ℛ is low or that of
the link 풮 → 풟 is high, the proposed SPMF has been
shown to be more beneficial over various relaying protocols.
Specifically, when compared to the conventional MF scheme,
the proposed scheme has been shown to achieve an improved
SOP performance of up to 3 dB in the practical WRN with
imperfect knowledge of shared information between the nodes.
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